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Abstract
We consider commuting in a congested urban area. While an efficient
time-varying toll may eliminate queuing, a toll may not be politically feasi-
ble. We study the benefit of a substitute: a parking fee at the workplace. An
optimal time-varying parking fee is charged at zero rate when there is queu-
ing and eliminates queuing when the rate is non-zero. Within certain limits,
inability to charge some drivers for parking does not reduce the potential
welfare gain. Drivers who cannot be charged travel when there is queuing.
In some cases, interaction between morning and evening commutes can be
exploited to remove queueing completely.
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1 Introduction
Traffic congestion is an economically important problem affecting cities every-
where. An average American household travels annually about 20,000 miles on
roads and spends about 15% of income on road transportation.1 In 2011, con-
gestion in the US caused around 5.5 billion hours of travel delay and 2.9 billion
gallons of extra fuel consumption with a total cost of $121 billion (Schrank et al.,
2012). Thus, policies to reduce the cost of mobility by car are of first order im-
portance. This paper considers the possibility of using parking fees rather than
congestion pricing to regulate urban congestion by influencing the timing of trips.
Ever since Dupuit (1844) and Pigou (1920), economists have advocated marginal
cost pricing of road capacity as a means to improve efficiency. However, very few
cities have actually implemented congestion tolls, notably Stockholm, Singapore,
London and recently Gothenburg.2 Congestion tolls have been proposed and then
scrapped in many places, including New York, Hong Kong and Copenhagen. So
there seems to be important political obstacles to congestion tolls and it is there-
fore of interest to look for alternative policies that can address road congestion.3
It is natural to look at parking pricing, since parking is already priced almost ev-
erywhere. Another reason, noted by Shoup (2005), is that the technology needed
to charge for parking is much simpler than that needed to charge for driving in
congested traffic.
1http://nhts.ornl.gov/2009/pub/profile 2012.pdf and http://www.bls.gov/cex.
2The benefits from congestion tolls can be large. For Stockholm, an annual efficiency gain of
70 million Euro has been estimated, not accounting for investment costs; these would be recovered
in 4-5 years (Eliasson, 2009). For London, an annual net efficiency gain of 100 million Euro has
been estimated and this figure does account for system costs (Leape, 2006). In the case of Milan,
an annual efficiency gain of 6 million Euro has been estimated; this figure does not account for
system costs, but these would be recovered in less than two years (Rotaris et al., 2010).
3De Borger and Proost (2010) discuss the political economy of road pricing.
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It is straightforward that the demand for trips to a city center is affected by the
full price of the trip, including the price of parking. But the problem is not just the
volume of traffic: the timing of demand is extremely important as is evident from
the sharp demand peaks that characterize urban traffic. The physics of congestion
implies that the amount of congestion delay is strongly dependent on the timing
of trips. If only departures from home in the morning became more dispersed
in time, then congestion delay could be much smaller while arrival times could
be quite unaffected. So there is a large potential efficiency gain in the retiming
of trips, even if the total traffic volume is unaffected. Congestion tolling aims to
achieve such temporal dispersion by applying a toll that varies over time with the
amount of congestion. The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential for
time-varying parking pricing to achieve the same effect.
We use a generalized version of the Vickrey (1969) bottleneck model for this
purpose (de Palma and Fosgerau, 2011a). The bottleneck model captures the
essence of congestion dynamics, describing a continuum of drivers equipped with
preferences regarding the timing of a trip to a common destination. This desti-
nation is located behind a bottleneck with a fixed capacity. If the rate at which
drivers want to pass the bottleneck exceeds its capacity then delay results.4 The
delay is a pure loss and it could be reduced with no effect on arrival times if people
could be induced to choose different departure times. A time-varying toll aims to
induce such rescheduling. As long as it induces appropriate rescheduling of trips,
it makes no difference where the toll is collected, it can be on any point of the trip.
In this paper we exploit that drivers park at the destination and pay a parking
4The bottleneck congestion technology is a means to represent city-wide congestion affecting
all traffic and the bottleneck does not necessarily correspond to any single place in a city (Daganzo,
2007; Geroliminis and Daganzo, 2008).
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fee. We will mainly consider a parking fee that accumulates at a non-negative
time-varying rate. This restriction fundamentally distinguishes such parking fees
from congestion tolls. Congestion tolls may vary freely up and down and may be
lower on the shoulders of the peak and high in the middle. A parking fee charged
at a positive rate during parking is always lower for later arrival times. As drivers
differ in the time at which they pass the bottleneck, they differ also in the parking
fee they pay. Therefore a parking fee can be used to induce rescheduling of trips
but in a less flexible way than a toll.
In summary, parking fees seem to be much easier to introduce than congestion
tolls. Like congestion tolls, parking fees may be used to disperse demand over
time in order to reduce congestion and gain efficiency, but the efficiency gain may
be limited by the restrictions inherent in typical parking fees. The objective of this
paper is to present an analysis of parking fees as a means to affect the timing of
road use and as an alternative to congestion tolls.5
We initially make assumptions that allow us to ignore the influence of the
time of unparking. We may think of the destination as the workplace, such that
the model describes the morning commute. For the morning commute, we find
that the imposition of a parking fee causes the departure interval to occur later
than it would in the absence of policy. This shift compensates the early drivers
who pay more for parking than later drivers. The optimal parking fee implements
a situation where every morning there is first an interval with a demand peak
that involves queueing just like an unregulated equilibrium except that it does not
involve everybody who travels in the morning. The optimal parking fee rate is
5The US Federal Highway Administration has a series of parking pricing projects under their
value pricing pilot program (in San Francisco, San Diego, and New York) that include time-varying
parking fee rates.
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zero during this interval such that the total parking fee is the same for all these
drivers. The optimal parking fee rate becomes positive at the time when the queue
has dissolved and is set such that zero queue is maintained during the remainder
of the morning. The total parking fee decreases with later arrival because drivers
who arrive later receive lower scheduling utility.
It is a recurring theme in the debate about charging for parking that some
drivers cannot be charged since they have private parking available. In the current
situation, it turns out they make no difference provided they can fit within the
period where the optimal parking fee rate is zero and queueing occurs. Thus,
within this limit, the existence of private parking does not affect the welfare gains
that can be achieved from a parking fee.
Another way that drivers may escape the time-varying parking fee rate is
through early bird specials, providing all day parking at a discounted price for
drivers who arrive at a parking lot by a certain time such as 8 am. The paper
characterizes the welfare maximizing combination of an early bird special with a
time-varying parking fee rate.
After examining the morning peak, we show that the conclusions of the paper
extend with few modifications to the evening commute, where parking is charged
at the origin of the trip instead of at the destination.6 The optimal parking fee
affects the evening commute similarly to the morning commute, except that the
order of the congested and uncongested intervals is reversed and the departure
6de Palma and Lindsey (2002) compare the morning and the evening commute, assuming that
scheduling utility is additively separable in travel time and delay, where delay is defined in terms
of arrival time for the morning commute and in terms of departure time for the evening commute.
Here, we apply a general form of scheduling preferences that applies to both the morning and the
evening commute. The difference in principle between the two commutes is whether the parking
fee is charged at the origin or at the destination of the trip.
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interval occurs earlier than it would in the absence of the parking fee.
The analysis so far ignores any interaction between the two commutes. The
paper also analyzes a whole day with explicit interaction between the two com-
mutes. Nonseparability between the morning and evening commutes implies that
the morning commute can be affected via the evening parking fee and vice versa.
It turns out the limitations involved in parking pricing as compared to freely time-
varying congestion tolling can then be overcome, and in our stylized setting a
parking fee scheme can be designed to remove congestion completely during both
commutes simultaneously. This finding strengthens the case for using parking
pricing to tackle urban road congestion.
The first to discuss regulation of parking in an economic context might be
Vickrey (1954), who suggested time-varying parking fees as a means of regulating
the use of parking space. Glazer and Niskanen (1992) present an analysis where
parking fees are analyzed as a substitute for road pricing. They note that the idea
rests on the assumption that an increase in the price of parking is equivalent to
an increase in the price of a trip. However, this equivalence fails for people who
can vary the length of time they park. Increasing the parking fee rate may induce
drivers to park for a shorter time, thereby allowing more people to use parking
spaces each day and thereby increasing traffic. However, Glazer and Niskanen
(1992) do not consider congestion dynamics (see also Verhoef et al., 1995).
In a static simulation model, Calthrop et al. (2000) analyze the efficiency gains
from parking fees and road pricing (a cordon toll). They find that these two poli-
cies are sub-additive: as roads are more efficiently priced, there is less need for
pricing of parking. In contrast to us, they also find that second-best pricing of
parking produces a higher welfare gain than a cordon charge around the simulated
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city. The explanation for this difference is that they consider the supply of parking
but not congestion dynamics, where we take the supply of parking as given and
consider how to exploit congestion dynamics using a time-varying parking fee.
Like us, Arnott et al. (1991) use the bottleneck model, but they consider a
case where parking spaces are located between the bottleneck and the CBD, on
a line away from the CBD and where the parking cost varies according to the
distance to the CBD. In their analysis, the parking fee does not depend on the
length of time the vehicle is parked. Arnott et al. (1991) find that optimal location-
dependent parking fees do not eliminate queueing, but induce drivers to park in
order of decreasing distance from the CBD, thereby concentrating arrival times
closer to work start times. They find that for most reasonable parameter values, the
optimal location-dependent parking fee is at least as efficient as the optimal time-
varying road toll. In contrast, in the present setting where parking is located at the
destination and with temporal but not spatial variation in the parking fee, only a
smaller share of the efficiency gain from the optimal road toll can be realized by
a parking fee. Qian et al. (2012) present an analysis similar to Arnott et al. (1991)
but with parking capacity provided in two parking lots, where the capacity and
parking fee may be regulated.
Arnott and Rowse (2009) focus on different aspects of parking. They analyze
parking in a spatially homogeneous downtown area. Drivers choose between curb-
side and garage parking, and curbside parking is cheapest. Cruising for parking
contributes to congestion and works to increase the full price for curbside parking
until it equals the price of garage parking. Then increasing the curbside parking
fee may generate an efficiency gain through reduction of cruising and the ensuing
congestion and the efficiency gain may be large relative to the parking fee rev-
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enue. Other papers related to cruising include Douglas (1975), Arnott and Rowse
(1999), Anderson and de Palma (2004), Arnott and Inci (2006), and Anderson and
de Palma (2007). Van Ommeren et al. (2011) estimates the cost of cruising for the
residents of Amsterdam. See also Proost and Van Dender (2008) and De Borger
and Wuyts (2009).
Zhang et al. (2005) link the morning and evening commutes by treating the
length of the work day as a decision variable in a model similar to ours. They do
not analyze time-varying parking fees.
Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 reviews the benchmark case of no
policy, while Section 4 reviews the optimal time-varying toll at the bottleneck.
Section 5 describes equilibrium under a parking fee, Section 6 considers the op-
timal parking fee, and Section 7 presents an example under specific assumptions
about scheduling preferences. Section 8 considers the case when some drivers
cannot be charged for parking and Section 9 characterizes social optimum in-
cluding an early bird special. Section 10 discusses the evening commute while
Section 11 considers the two commutes in combination. Section 12 concludes.
Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model formulation
There is a continuum of mass N > 0 of drivers who all have to pass a congested
bottleneck. They have identical preferences concerning the timing and cost of
their trip expressed by the twice differentiable money metric utility u (t, a) − τ,
defined for all t ≤ a and τ , where t is the arrival time at the bottleneck, a is the
exit time from the bottleneck and τ is the (monetary) cost of the trip. We speak of
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the length of the duration from t to a as the travel time or the bottleneck delay. We
consider only costs in the form of a toll at the bottleneck or a parking fee at the
destination. We refer to u as the scheduling utility.7 Without loss of generality, t
represents also the departure time and a the arrival time at the destination. It is also
useful to define the schedule delay utility v(t) ≡ u(t, t), which is the scheduling
utility that is obtained when travel time is zero. Throughout this paper we make
the following assumptions regarding the scheduling utility.
Assumption 1 Marginal scheduling utility satisfies u1 > 0 and u2 < 0. Schedule
delay utility v(t) is strictly quasiconcave and attains maximum v(t∗) at t∗.
The assumption first requires that drivers always strictly prefer to depart later
and to arrive earlier, no matter when they depart and arrive. The assumptions on
v will ensure the uniqueness of equilibrium in the model.
The bottleneck has a capacity of ψ cars per time unit. Cars who have not yet
been served wait before the bottleneck, which serves travelers in the sequence of
arrival (first-in-first-out). The bottleneck capacity is always used if there are cars
waiting before it. The physical extension of the queue has no consequences, we
say the queue is vertical.
Cumulative departures are denoted R (·) and departures take place during an
interval [a0, a1]. WhenR (·) is differentiable, we let ρ (·) = R′ (·) be the departure
rate. If queueing begins at time a0 and there is still queue at time t, then the queue
length at time t is R (t)− ψ (t− a0) and the driver departing from home at time t
7A simple version of scheduling preferences has the so-called α − β − γ form formulated by
Vickrey (1969), estimated by Small (1982), and used by numerous authors since.
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exits the bottleneck at time
t+
R (t)− ψ (t− a0)
ψ
=
R (t)
ψ
+ a0. (1)
After passing the bottleneck, cars enter a parking space, which is vertical like
the queue. Drivers pay a parking fee at a positive time-varying rate from the time
of arrival at the parking lot until a time Ω which is the same for all drivers. The
latter assumption allows us to focus attention on the interaction of the parking
fee with the departure time and rules out any interaction with the later departure
from the parking space. Specifically, it does not require that all cars have to leave
the parking space at time Ω. It is sufficient if utility is a separable part of a more
comprehensive utility that also describes preferences regarding times later than Ω,
Later, in Section 11, we shall consider a case without separability between the two
commutes.
We will not consider situations involving mass departures and so the cumu-
lative departure rate will be invertible. For this reason and since the queue is
first-in-first-out, we can make a change of variable and equivalently define the
parking fee rate pi (·) ≥ 0 in terms of the departure time t. The parking fee for a
driver departing and arriving at the bottleneck at time t is then P (t) =
∫ Ω
t pi (s) ds,
where P ′ (t) = −pi (t).8
The analysis considers Nash equilibrium, which is defined by the property
that, given the departure schedule R, no driver is able to strictly increase utility by
unilaterally changing departure time. All drivers achieve the same utility in Nash
equilibrium. The welfare measure employed is the equilibrium utility of drivers
8There is a slight mathematical issue here, since −pi could differ from P ′ on sets of measure
zero; it is, however, not restrictive to assume they are equal.
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times the number of drivers plus the revenue from any toll or parking fee. Since
utility is the scheduling utility minus the monetary cost, the welfare measure is
equal to the total scheduling utility obtained by drivers.
3 No policy equilibrium
Consider as an introduction the case of no policy. Nash equilibrium has arrivals
at the bottleneck during an interval [a0, a1] , the endpoints of this interval are en-
dogenous and determined in equilibrium. Equilibrium requires that there cannot
be unused capacity during this interval, that there cannot be queue at the time of
the last departure and that the utility of the first and last drivers to depart are the
same.9 Then the departure interval is uniquely determined by the conditions
v (a0) = v (a1) ,
a1 = a0 +N/ψ.
The conditions imply that a0 < t∗ < a1, since v is strictly quasiconcave. There is
always queue in the interior of [a0, a1] . The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1.
In equilibrium, the number of departuresR (t) that have occurred at time t can
be determined using (1) by the equation
v (a0) = u
(
t,
R (t)
ψ
+ a0
)
. (2)
This determines R (t) since a → u (t, a) is invertible for all t. Moreover, differ-
9If there were unused capacity with departures before or after then some driver could move
into the gap and gain. If there were queue at the time of the last departure, then the last driver
could postpone departure without affecting arrival which would yield a gain.
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v(t)
a0 a1t* t
Figure 1: Schedule delay utility and no policy equilibrium
entiating (2), the departure rate is given by
ρ (t) = −ψu1
(
t, R(t)
ψ
+ a0
)
u2
(
t, R(t)
ψ
+ a0
) > 0.
Here and later, the departure rate is determined almost everywhere.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative departures R as well as the number of cars that
have passed the bottleneck ψ(t−a0). The vertical distance between the two curves
corresponds to the length of the queue and the horizontal distance corresponds to
the delay in the queue.
4 The optimal time-varying toll at the bottleneck
It is well known that a time varying toll can achieve maximum efficiency by re-
moving the incentive to queue (Vickrey, 1969, 1973; Arnott et al., 1993; de Palma
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N
R(t)
(t-a0)
a0 a1 t
Figure 2: No policy equilibrium
and Fosgerau, 2011b). The efficient toll is charged at the bottleneck at the time
varying rate τ (t). Since total demand is assumed to be completely inelastic, we
can set τ (a0) = 0 at no loss of generality. Efficiency requires v (a0) = v (a1) so
the efficient toll leaves the departure interval [a0, a1] unchanged relative to the no
policy equilibrium while maintaining the departure rate at ρ (t) = ψ. This requires
τ (t) = v (t)−v (a0) . It follows that the efficient toll inherits strict quasiconcavity
from v. Moreover, a0 < t∗ < a1, and the efficient toll is increasing on [a0, t∗] and
decreasing on [t∗, a1] . The revenue from the efficient toll is
TR = ψ
∫ a1
a0
(v (t)− v (a0)) dt.
Drivers achieve the same utility in equilibrium as under no policy and hence the
revenue from the efficient toll is equal to the welfare gain.
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5 Parking fee equilibrium
Consider now a parking fee P (t) =
∫ Ω
t pi (s) ds, where Ω is larger than any de-
parture time. By definition it is decreasing as a function of arrival time (since
P ′ (t) = −pi (t)) and hence it cannot replicate the efficient toll, which is increas-
ing early in the peak.
Some basic properties of equilibrium are given in the following theorem. The
proof is included here in the main text since it is helpful in motivating the condi-
tions of the theorem.
Theorem 1 Consider a parking fee schedule P (·) with
b0 < t∗ < b1 (3)
v(t)− P (t) ≥ v(b0)− P (b0)⇔ t ∈ [b0, b1] (4)
b1 = b0 +
N
ψ
(5)
pi(t) + u2(t, t) < 0. (6)
Then ∆ ≡ P (b0) − P (b1) ≤ ∆∗ ≡ v (t∗) − v (a0) and there exists a unique
departure time equilibrium solution defined on [b0, b1]. b0 increases strictly as a
function of ∆ as ∆ ranges over [0,∆∗].
Proof. That ∆ ≤ ∆∗ follows from (3) and the quasiconcavity of v. Condition
(4) ensures that nobody will want to depart outside [b0, b1] and condition (5) en-
sures that all cars fit within this interval with capacity utilized throughout. Exis-
tence and uniqueness of equilibrium then follows if there exists a unique departure
rate maintaining constant utility for departures in [b0, b1] . Condition (4) ensures
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v(t)


b0 b1t* tb*a0 a1
Figure 3: Equilibrium with parking fee
that utility can be constant in equilibrium for departures within [b0, b1] with non-
negative queue length and this ensures that capacity is fully utilized during [b0, b1].
The equilibrium queue length exists uniquely and then so does the equilibrium de-
parture rate from home. Condition (6) ensures that the equilibrium departure rate
from home is strictly positive. The final conclusion of the theorem follows from
the strict quasiconcavity of v.
Define for convenience b∗ as the unique time b∗ > t∗ where v (b0) = v (b∗) .
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3.
6 Optimal parking fee
Fixing the difference ∆ at some value and finding the corresponding departure
interval [b0, b1], welfare is maximized for a parking fee that extracts maximal rev-
enue while satisfying the condition (4).
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Find the unique b∗ > t∗ with v (b0) = v (b∗) (see Figure 3). Let P (t) = P (b0)
for t ∈ [b0, b∗] . This satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1. It is also true that
R (b∗) = ψ(b∗ − b0), such that the queue is exactly gone at time b∗.
During the remaining time [b∗, b1] let P (t) = v (t)−v (b0)+P (b0) . This also
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1.
With this fee, utility is constant during [b∗, b1] so there can be no queue. There-
fore it is not possible to extract further revenue during this interval. We have
therefore established the optimal parking fee conditional on a value of ∆.
Assume without loss of generality that P (b1) = 0. The welfare function de-
fined in terms of ∆ is
W (∆) = ψ (b∗ − b0) v (b0) + ψ
∫ b1
b∗
v (t) dt. (7)
We can find the optimal value of ∆ as given in the following theorem. All proofs
of this and theorems following below are given in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 The optimal parking fee rate is
pi (t) =

0, t ∈ [b0, b∗] ,
−v′ (t) , t ∈ ]b∗, b1] .
Assume further that v (·) is concave. Then the welfare function W (·) is quasicon-
cave on ]0,∆∗[, the welfare maximizing value of ∆ exists, is unique and satisfies
∆ = (b∗ − b0) v′ (b0) ∈]0,∆∗[.
The first statement of this theorem is that the optimal parking fee rate is zero
during the interval [b0, b∗] , which is the interval where there is queue under the
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R(t)-(t-a0)
N/
a0 a1 tb0 b* b1
Figure 4: Evolution of the queue under no policy and under the optimal parking
fee
optimal parking fee. Thus all drivers in this interval pay the same total amount for
parking. The parking fee is concentrated on the interval ]b∗, b1] , where it ensures
that there is no queue.
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of queue length under no policy and under
the optimal parking fee. The dashed line shows that under no policy the queue
first builds and then dissipates between times a0 and a1 and that these times span
a duration of N/ψ time units. Queueing begins later at time b0 under the optimal
parking fee and it also ends earlier at time b∗. Departures continue during [b∗, b1]
at the capacity rate such that there is no queue during this interval. The latest
arrival at time b1 occurs later than it would under no policy.
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7 Linear specification
This section specializes results to the case of so-called α − β − γ preferences
(Vickrey, 1969; Arnott et al., 1993). Let v (a) = β · min (a, 0) − γ · max (a, 0)
and let utility be u (t, a) − τ = v (a) − α · (a− t) − τ. Then α is the value of
time, the marginal cost of lateness is γ and the marginal cost of earliness is β.
Let 0 < β < α, 0 < γ, as is typically assumed (Small, 1982). Then u satisfies
the requirements stated in Section 2. The following proposition, proved in the
Appendix, provides the optimal welfare gain in terms of the welfare function W ,
defined in (7). It thus states that the optimal welfare gain is obtained when the
difference ∆ in parking fee for the first and last drivers is equal to βγ
β+γ
N
ψ
. The
proposition also evaluates the welfare gain in that case.
Proposition 1 The optimal parking fee leads to a welfare gain of
W
(
βγ
β + γ
N
ψ
)
−W (0) = N
2
ψ
β2γ
2 (β + γ)2
.
The interval without queuing has duration
b1 − b∗ = β
β + γ
N
ψ
.
Thus, a share β
β+γ
of drivers arrive during the later period when the parking
fee removes queueing. The maximal welfare gain corresponds to a share of β
β+γ
of the maximal welfare gain that can be obtained by a time-varying toll at the
bottleneck and the share is strictly less than 1/2 when β < γ as would commonly
be assumed. It is also straightforward to verify that the revenue from the optimal
parking fee corresponds to the same share of β
β+γ
of the revenue from the optimal
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time varying toll. The optimal coarse toll, i.e. a toll that has only two values,
captures half the welfare gain that can be obtained by the optimal time-varying
toll (Fosgerau, 2011) and so the optimal parking fee approaches this welfare gain
when β is close to γ. These results are invariant under proportional changes in
(β, α, γ) . A value of γ/β in the range 2− 4 is reasonable and leads to an optimal
welfare gain in the range [0.08, 0.11] ·N2/ψ, and this is between one fifth and one
third of the gain that could be obtained by the optimal time varying toll or between
two fifths and two thirds of the gain that could be obtained by the optimal coarse
toll.
8 Private parking
We consider now a situation where some drivers cannot be charged for parking.
This could be because they have private parking available that cannot be charged
by the public authority. Let N = Nc +Nu, where Nc is the number of drivers that
can be charged andNu is the number of drivers that cannot be charged. Drivers are
otherwise identical and they cannot affect whether they can be charged for parking
or not. This assumption enables us to focus on the direct effects of parking fees
without having to worry about selection into groups. Charged and uncharged
drivers share the same queue at the bottleneck.
Let the departures of uncharged drivers take place during Su withConv (Su) =
[bu0 , b
u
1 ] and similarly let departures for charged drivers take place during S
c with
Conv (Sc) = [bc0, b
c
1] . Let b0 = min (b
u
0 , b
c
0), and b1 = max (b
u
1 , b
c
1) . The follow-
ing theorem establishes some properties of Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 3 Consider a parking fee satisfying the conditions (3-6) of Theorem
1. Then, in Nash equilibrium, capacity is fully utilized during [b0, b1] and b1 =
b0 +N/ψ. Uncharged drivers depart within the interval [b0, b∗] with b∗ < b1.
The theorem shows that uncharged drivers depart within the period when there
is congestion and schedule delay utility v is largest. Some of the charged drivers
are induced to travel later and they all achieve lower utility.
Let Nu and Nc be given. We may then ask what is the optimal charge. Us-
ing Theorem 2 and the preceding discussion, the optimal charge that charges Nc
drivers satisfies v (bu0) = v
(
bu0 +
Nu
ψ
)
and pi (t) = −v′ (t) for t > bu0 + Nuψ ≡ bu1 ≡
bc0. Departures of charged drivers take place from b
c
0 to b
c
1 = b
c
0 + Nc/ψ. We have
∆ = P (bc1)− P (bc0) = v (bc1)− v (bc0) . In case ∆ is larger than its optimal value
from Theorem 2, then there can be an early period with zero charge for charged
drivers such that the optimum outcome is obtained. If on the other hand, the num-
ber of drivers that can be charged is less than the optimal number, then the optimal
charge under this restriction is the one just described.
9 Early bird specials
Early bird specials are common in cities around the world (Victoria Transport
Policy Institute, 2012) and they are targeted at commuters. Early bird specials
provide all day parking at a discounted price for all-day parkers who arrive at a
parking lot by a certain time such as 8 am. This section presents an analysis of how
early bird specials can be used to reduce traffic congestion and improve welfare.
An early bird special is given by (Neb, aeb, Peb) , where the discounted price Peb
is available to the first Neb drivers that arrive prior to aeb. This definition does not
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require the constraints given by Neb and aeb to be binding and so it incorporates
the cases where either Neb and aeb is large, such that it is only the number of early
birds or the latest arrival time of early birds that is constrained. Denote by [e0, e1]
the interval during which the early birds travel.
Drivers who do not receive the early bird special, we label regular drivers and
we carry forward all previous notation to them: regular drivers pay the regular
parking fee pi, they travel during [b0, b1] and b∗ is the time after t∗ where v (b0) =
v (b∗) . The following theorem characterizes welfare optimum under a parking
fee combined with an early bird special. The welfare measure is again the sum
of driver utility and parking fee revenues, which is simply the scheduling utility
achieved.
Theorem 4 Under the socially optimal combination of a regular parking fee pi
with an early bird special (Neb, aeb, Peb), capacity is fully utilized throughout a
period of length N/ψ, where b0 = e0 + Neb/ψ and b1 = e0 + N/ψ. The time-
varying parking fee is
pi (t) =

0, t ∈ [b0, b∗]
−v′ (t) t ∈ ]b∗, b1] .
There is queueing during [b0, b∗] and no queue during [b∗, b1] . Departures begin
later than in unregulated equilibrium such that v (e0) > v (b1). The early bird
charge lies between the total parking fees paid by the first and last regular drivers
P (b1) < Peb < P (b0) .
Figure 5 illustrates the social optimum for the general case. Evaluating the
first-order conditions for social optimum for the combination of a time-varying
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Figure 5: Social optimum with early bird special
parking fee with an early bird special in the case of linear scheduling preferences
as discussed in section 7 leads to e0 = −γ2 β+2γ(β+γ)2 Nψ and b0 = γβ+2γ e0, such that
b0 − e0 = 12 γβ+γ Nψ and the optimal share of early birds out of all drivers is 12 γβ+γ .
With γ/β in the range [2, 4] , this share lies in the range [0.33, 0.40] and it is always
smaller than 1/2.
10 The evening commute
The analysis so far has concerned the morning commute, but with minor modi-
fications it applies to the evening commute as well. This section will show that
most conclusions carry more or less directly over from the morning to the evening
commute.
Recall first that the analysis of the morning commute ignored any interaction
with the evening commute, which could occur, e.g., through the duration of the
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period at work. This simplification greatly facilitates analysis and will be retained
in the analysis of the evening commute.
Our general specification of scheduling preferences treats the departure time
and the arrival time symmetrically, so it is not specific to the morning commute,
and applies equally well to the evening. We may consider scheduling preferences
that are specific to the evening commute with t∗ now being the preferred time of
instantaneous transfer from work to home.
The treatment of congestion can also be exactly the same in the two commutes.
Hence the evening no-policy equilibrium and the optimal time-varying toll exactly
parallel those of the morning.
The difference is in the effect of a parking fee paid at the origin of the trip
rather than at the destination. The parking fee is charged at the work place. Hence
it creates an incentive to reduce the time spent at the workplace. This is equally
true in both commutes. In the morning, the parking fee decreases with later de-
parture (from home), while in the evening the parking fee increases with later
departure (from work). This reversal has the effect of reversing the order of the
two distinct intervals under the socially optimal parking fee. Recall that in the
morning social optimum, there is first an interval of queueing, where the parking
fee rate is zero, this is followed by an interval where the parking fee rate is −v′
and where there is no queue. In the evening social optimum, the evening parking
fee rate is first equal to v′ during an interval and this maintains the departure rate
from work at the bottleneck capacity such that a queue does not arise. Later, in
the evening, the parking fee rate is zero and a queueing interval occurs.
Early birds or drivers with private parking are not affected, they have no in-
centive to depart early and will depart during the period when the parking fee rate
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is zero. Thus the conclusions for the morning commute regarding drivers with
private parking carry over to these cases.
11 Morning and evening commutes integrated
This section considers the morning and the evening commutes simultaneously and
shows that interaction between commutes can imply that a parking fee can be de-
signed to remove queueing completely. The parking fee is still restricted to be
positive at any time so a parking fee in the morning can only reduce queueing in
the morning but not remove it; similarly a parking fee in the evening can only re-
duce queueing in the evening. But it is possible to exploit interaction between the
two commutes that occurs through the length of the time spent at work. Then the
morning parking fee affects not only the morning commute but also the evening
commute through the length of the working day; similarly a parking fee during
the evening commute will affect the morning commute. Somewhat surprisingly,
queueing can then be removed in both commutes simultaneously.
Consider drivers who commute to and from work. In the morning they pass
through a bottleneck with capacity ψm, in the evening they pass through a bot-
tleneck with capacity ψe and the two capacities may be different. The departure
time from home in the morning is denoted tm, departures begin at time cm and
cumulative departures in the morning are denoted Rm. Capacity will always be
fully utilized during the commute such that cm+
Rm(tm)
ψm
is the arrival time at work.
The evening commute from home to work is denoted similarly with subscripts e.
We impose more structure on utility than we have before in this paper. In
particular we assume that utility is separable in utility achieved at home at rate hm
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prior to departure, utility achieved at home at rate he after returning home in the
evening and utility achieved associated with the duration at work Γ.10 Define then
the money-metric utility function
u (tm, te) =
∫ tm
tmin
hm (s) ds+
∫ tmax
ce+
Re(te)
ψe
he (s) ds
+Γ
(
te − cm − Rm (tm)
ψm
)
−
∫ te
cm+
Rm(tm)
ψm
pi (s) ds.
Utility accumulates at home from time tmin in the morning and after time tmax
in the evening. The values of tmin and tmax are arbitrary as they have no effect
on marginal utilities and hence have no effect on behavior. If it were the case
that Γ′′ = 0, then the utility function would be additively separable into a part
depending only on tm and another part depending only on te. In this case the
morning and evening commutes could be analyzed separately and we would be
back in the situation from previous sections. So we require that Γ > 0,Γ′ >
0,Γ′′ < 0. Moreover, utility rates hm, he satisfy hm, he > 0, h′m < 0 < h
′
e. We
assume that the ranges of the functions involved and their derivatives are sufficient
to ensure the existence of equilibrium. Parking is charged at the positive time-
varying rate pi (·) during the time spent at work.
It is clear from the previous analysis and for the same reasons as before that
there are two commuting intervals in equilibrium, that capacity is fully utilized
during these intervals if the parking fee is not too high, and that in each commute
10This assumes that workers can decide how much time to spend at work on any given day. An
alternative would be to assume a fixed duration at work. This would however have the implication
that the departure rate from work would be the same as the arrival rate at work, and this is at most
a constant ψm. Then if ψm < ψe there would never be queue in the evening or if ψm > ψe there
would be an increasing queue at all departure times from work where capacity ψm is utilized. Both
implications seem strange.
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the queue is exactly gone at the time of the last departure. We assume that utility
is such that the commuting intervals do not overlap. The equilibrium departure
rates can be found from the first-order conditions for utility maximization. The
next lemma establishes that drivers pass the bottleneck in the same sequence in
the two commutes. This insight is very convenient for the further analysis.
Lemma 1 Drivers depart in the same sequence in the two commutes.
The next theorem establishes that it is possible to construct a parking fee that
implements equilibrium such that there is no queueing in either commute. The
theorem statement defines a function f (), which relates departure times in the
morning to departure times in the evening when departures in both commutes
take place at the capacity rates and commuters depart in the same sequence in the
two commutes.
Theorem 5 Given times cm and ce > cm +N/ψm, define the function
f (tm) =
ψm
ψe
(tm − cm) + ce, tm ∈ [cm, cm +N/ψm] . (8)
Assume that cm, ce satisfy the following conditions:
hm (cm) = Γ
′ (ce − cm) (9)
he
(
ce +
N
ψe
)
= Γ′
(
ce +
N
ψe
− cm − N
ψm
)
(10)
max {hm (t) , he (f (t))} ≤ Γ′ (f (t)− t) , t ∈ [cm, cm +N/ψm] . (11)
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The following parking fee leads to an equilibrium with no queueing:
pi (t) =

Γ′ (f (t)− t)− hm (t) , cm ≤ t < cm +N/ψm
Γ′ (t− f−1 (t))− he (t) , ce ≤ t < ce +N/ψe
0, otherwise.
Conditions (9) and (10) indicate the socially optimal equilibrium with no queue-
ing.
It can be verified that a solution to conditions (9) and (10) must be unique.
These conditions are not generally restrictive, they merely require that the func-
tions involved have ranges that are sufficiently large to allow a solution. Condition
(11) may be restrictive if capacities are unequal, ψm 6= ψe, but it is redundant if
they are equal.
The parking fee of the theorem implements a situation where the morning
commute takes place during [cm, cm +N/ψm] with departures at the capacity
rate ψm. The definition (8) ensures that if drivers depart at the capacity rate ψm
during the morning commute, then they depart at the capacity rate ψe during
[ce, ce +N/ψe] in the evening. Conditions (9-11) ensure that the parking fee rate
is always positive and that pi (cm) = pi (ce +N/ψe) = 0.
Compared to a situation with no parking fee and first departures still at cm
and ce, the welfare gain from the parking fee of Theorem 5 is the total parking
fee payment during the two commutes. The parking fee during [cm, ce +N/ψe]
when all are at work is set to zero in the theorem but can be larger provided
the equilibrium conditions are not affected. The parking fee revenue during this
period does then not affect behavior (as we assume fixed demand) and does hence
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not contribute to any change in welfare.
12 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the potential efficiency gains that may be realized through
retiming of commuting trips due to a time-varying parking fee charged at a posi-
tive rate at the workplace. At the social optimum, the commute to work is divided
into two distinct intervals by the optimal parking fee. During the first interval,
parking is charged at a zero rate and there is queueing. During the second inter-
val, parking is charged at a time-varying rate such that there is no queue while
capacity remains fully utilized. The sequence of these two periods is reversed
from the morning to the evening commute. Parking fees create an incentive to
reduce the length of time spent at work.
With private parking, a group of drivers cannot be charged for parking. It turns
out not to matter for equilibrium departure time outcomes for the optimal charge,
provided the drivers who cannot be charged are few enough to fit within the con-
gested part of the commute. It is thus possible to exempt a group of drivers from
paying the parking fee without sacrificing the welfare gains that can be achieved.
Early bird specials may be designed to increase efficiency even further.
The analysis up to this point treated the morning and evening commutes sep-
arately. During either commute, a parking fee can reduce congestion but not re-
move it. When there is interaction between the commutes through the duration
of time spent at work then it is possible to affect the evening commute through
a parking fee during the morning and vice versa. The paper has exhibited a case
where it is then possible to utilize the interaction to remove congestion completely
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during both commutes through a parking fee.
It is an essential characteristic of parking fees considered in the paper that the
total parking fee payment is decreasing as a function of the arrival time at work
in the morning and increasing as a function of the departure time from work in
the evening. This restriction leads to results that differ from the case of a time-
varying toll. If it were possible to charge for parking at a negative rate, then any
time-varying toll could be replicated and the well-known analysis of such a toll
could be applied.
It is straightforward to extend the results of this paper to the case of elastic
demand. A way to proceed is to let aggregate demand depend on the average
utility obtained in equilibrium. The optimal toll can then be obtained by fixing
P (b1), which amounts to adding a fixed component to the parking fee. If P (b1) =
−Nv′ (b1) ∂b1∂N then the marginal benefit of adding a car equals the marginal cost.
In this way the model can be extended to deal with externalities including e.g.
congestion cruising for a limited number of parking spaces and other congestion
externalities.
The current analysis has focused on the interaction of a time-varying parking
fee rate with congestion dynamics. We focus on the timing of parking and thus
complement the earlier contributions discussed in the introduction that, simply
put, consider where and for how long to park. Future research could seek to
integrate these perspectives in a unified analysis. It would also be natural to seek
to allow for heterogenous drivers, as has been done for the bottleneck model by
Lindsey (2004) and recently van den Berg and Verhoef (2011).11
11With the dynamic bottleneck model, METROPOLIS, implemented for large networks, such
complications could be envisaged. This will allow to test the robustness of our predictions for
large scale networks (see de Palma et al., 1997).
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2. The first part of the theorem has already been established. It
remains to determine the welfare maximizing value of ∆. Compute the derivative
of W as
W ′ (∆) = ψ (b′∗ − b′0) v (b0) + ψ (b∗ − b0) v′ (b0) b′0 + ψ (v (b1) b′1 − v (b∗) b′∗) .
Use that v (b0) = v (b∗) , b′1 = b
′
0, and ∆ = v (b0)−v (b1) to reduce this expression
to
W ′ (∆) = [(b∗ − b0) v′ (b0)−∆]ψb′0,
and note that this is zero if and only if ∆ = (b∗ − b0) v′ (b0) . Next use that 1 =
v′ (b0) b′0 − v′ (b1) b′1 and b′1 = b′0 to find that b′0 = (v′ (b0)− v′ (b1))−1 > 0. Note
that
W ′ (0) = [(b∗ − b0) v′ (b0)]ψb′0 > 0
and that
W ′ (∆∗) = −∆∗ψb′0 < 0,
since b0 = b∗ at ∆ = ∆∗. Then there is at least one value of ∆ between 0 and
∆∗ with W ′ (∆) = 0. Evaluate next the second derivative of W at a point with
W ′ (∆) = 0 :
W ′′ (∆) = [(b′∗ − b′0) v′ (b0) + (b∗ − b0) v′′ (b0) b′0 − 1]ψb′0
+ [(b∗ − b0) v′ (b0)−∆]ψb′′0
= [(b′∗ − b′0) v′ (b0) + (b∗ − b0) v′′ (b0) b′0 − 1]ψb′0
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=[
v′ (b0)− v′ (b∗)
v′ (b∗)
v′ (b0) b′0 + (b∗ − b0) v′′ (b0) b′0 − 1
]
ψb′0,
where the last equality follows upon noting that v′(b0)b′0 = v
′(b∗)b′∗. This is
negative if and only if
v′ (b0)− v′ (b∗)
v′ (b∗)
v′ (b0) b′0 + (b∗ − b0) v′′ (b0) b′0 < 1.
But this inequality holds since v′ (b∗) < 0 and v is concave. Thus W ′ (∆) = 0
implies that W ′′ (∆) < 0 and hence that W is quasiconcave on the interval [0,∆∗]
such that W has a unique maximum there. It is straightforward to verify that this
maximum is global.
Proof of Theorem 3. Given the assumptions of Theorem 1, all departures
will take place within the interval [b0, b1] in Nash equilibrium. Now, v (b0) =
u
(
b0,
R(b0)
ψ
+ b0
)
> u
(
b1,
R(b1)
ψ
+ b0
)
= v (b1) , where the inequality follows
since the last driver pays a strictly smaller parking fee than the first but achieves
the same utility. Moreover, Uu ≡ u
(
t, R(t)
ψ
+ b0
)
, t ∈ Su is constant, which re-
quires that there is queue almost always during Su. Equilibrium similarly requires
that U c ≡ u
(
t, R(t)
ψ
+ b0
)
− P (t), t ∈ Sc is constant. Thus u
(
t, R(t)
ψ
+ b0
)
is
strictly decreasing on points of Sc where pi (t) > 0. These conditions imply that
all uncharged drivers obtain utility v (b0) . Therefore they must all depart in the in-
terval [b0, b∗] , where b∗ is defined by the equation v (b0) = v (b∗) , which implies
that b∗ < b1 by quasiconcavity of v.
Proof of Proposition 1. Given ∆ = P (b0) − P (b1) , with 0 < ∆ < v (t∗) −
36
v (a0) =
N
ψ
βγ
β+γ
and P (b1) = 0, it is straightforward to find that
b0 =
∆− γN
ψ
β + γ
, b∗ = −β
γ
∆− γN
ψ
β + γ
, b1 =
∆ + βN
ψ
β + γ
.
Then the welfare given ∆ is
W (∆) = Nv (b0)− ψ (b1 − b∗) ∆/2
= Nβ
∆− γN
ψ
β + γ
− ψ
∆ + βNψ
β + γ
+
β
γ
∆− γN
ψ
β + γ
 ∆
2
=
1
β + γ
(
−βγN
2
ψ
+ β∆N − ψβ + γ
γ
∆2
2
)
.
This is maximal when
∆ =
βγ
β + γ
N
ψ
.
In this case
b0 =
−γ2
(β + γ)2
N
ψ
, b∗ =
βγ
(β + γ)2
N
ψ
, b1 =
β2 + 2βγ
(β + γ)2
N
ψ
.
The optimal time-varying toll leads to a welfare gain of N
2
ψ
βγ
2(β+γ)
.
Proof of Theorem 4. Clearly, early birds depart before other drivers during
[e0, e1] where e1 < t∗. They pay the same price for parking and will therefore
queue, departing at the rate ρeb (t) > ψ,with Reb (e1) = Neb and the last arrival
time being e0 + Nebψ . For other drivers, it is optimal that they are charged according
to a fee as in section 6 where there is first an interval [b0, b∗] of arrival times where
the parking fee rate is zero, there is queueing and v (b0) = v (b∗), next there is
an interval [b∗, b1] of arrival times with no queueing and a parking fee rate that is
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pi (t) = −v′ (t) . We recall that b0 ≤ t∗ ≤ b∗ < b1. It is also clear that capacity
should be fully utilized during the commute. This requires that the last arrival
time of the early birds is the same as the first arrival time of the ordinary drivers
e0 +
Neb
ψ
= b0. All drivers pass the bottleneck during [e0, b1] , so b1 = e0 + N/ψ.
Thus the timing of departures is determined by e0 and b0. The difference between
the parking fees Peb and P is then also determined since all drivers achieve the
same utility in equilibrium.
Welfare is
W = ψ · (b0 − e0) v (e0) + ψ · (b∗ − b0) v (b0) + ψ
∫ b1
b∗
v (t) dt,
which is composed ofψ·(b0 − e0) early birds achieving scheduling utility v (e0) , ψ·
(b∗ − b0) ordinary drivers achieving scheduling utility v (b0) and the remaining
ψ · (b1 − b∗) achieving scheduling utility v (t) . The timing of departures is chosen
through e0 and b0 to optimize welfare with first-order conditions (when b0 < t∗ <
b∗)
v (e0) = (b0 − e0) v′ (e0) + v (b1) ,
v (e0) = v (b0)− (b∗ − b0) v′ (b0) .
Now v′ (e0) , v′ (b0) > 0 such that v (b1) < v (e0) < v (b0) . Utilities are equal in
equilibrium so P (b1) < Peb < P (b0).
A corner solution arises when b0 = t∗ = b∗. In that case only e0 may vary and
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has first-order condition
v (e0) = (t∗ − e0) v′ (e0) + v (b1) ,
implying that again v (b1) < v (e0) < v (b0) .
Proof of Lemma 1. The first-order condition for the choice of departure time in
the morning, given the departure time in the evening, is
0 =
∂u (tm, te)
∂tm
= hm (tm)−
(
Γ′
(
te − cm − Rm (tm)
ψm
)
− pi
(
cm +
Rm (tm)
ψm
))
ρm (tm)
ψm
.
Observe that any tm can only solve the first-order condition for one value of
te. The function te (tm) thus defined then is single-valued. By the Berge max-
imum theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 2006), te has compact graph and hence
te is continuous. We take for granted that it is continuously differentiable. The
second-order condition requires that
∂2u (tm, te)
∂t2m
≤ 0.
Differentiating the first-order condition with respect to tm leads to
0 =
∂2u (tm, te)
∂t2m
− Γ′′
(
te − cm − Rm (tm)
ψm
)
∂te
∂tm
and hence ∂te
∂tm
≥ 0. It is possible to have ∂te
∂tm
= 0 at points, but ∂te
∂tm
= 0 cannot
hold on any interval. If it did, then there would be a mass departure in the evening,
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which is ruled out in equilibrium (if a mass departure should occur, then it is
always strictly utility increasing to postpone departure until immediately after the
mass departure). This shows that ∂te
∂tm
> 0 almost everywhere.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let Rm (tm) = ψm (tm − cm) in the first commute and
Re (te) = ψe (te − ce) in the second. Then there is no queueing while capacity is
fully utilized. Utility for a driver with departure times tm and te is then
u (tm, te) =
∫ tm
tmin
hm (s) ds+
∫ tmax
te
he (s) ds+ Γ (te − tm)−
∫ te
tm
pi (s) ds.
Consider a driver departing from home at time tm ∈ [cm, cm +N/ψm]. Then
the first-order condition for the choice of the second departure time has only one
solution, namely at te = f (tm) by the definition of pi. Moreover, the second-order
condition is satisfied,
∂2u (tm, t)
∂t2
∣∣∣∣∣
t=te
= −h′ (te) + Γ′′ (te − tm)
(
1− 1
f ′ (tm)
)
− pi′ (te)
= −h′ (te) + Γ′′ (te − tm)−
(
Γ′′
(
te − f−1 (te)
)(
1− 1
f ′ (tm)
)
− h′ (te)
)
=
Γ′′ (te − tm)
f ′ (tm)
< 0.
With the optimal choice of departure time from work, te = f (tm), utility is con-
stant over the interval tm ∈ [cm, cm +N/ψm], since
∂u (tm, f (tm))
∂tm
= hm (tm)−Γ′ (te − tm)+pi (tm)+(−he (te) + Γ′ (te − tm)− pi (te)) f ′ (tm) = 0,
by the definition of pi. Utility is smaller outside the interval by the conditions of
the Theorem. Then the cumulative departure functions Rm, Re defined above do
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in fact lead to equilibrium.
Condition (11) ensures that all drivers would benefit from increased duration
at work. Due to conditions (9) and (10), this is not possible due to the restriction
that the parking fee rate must be positive. Hence the equilibrium indicated by (9)
and (10) is socially optimal.
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